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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the evolution of fiscal federalism in Spain and Canada, 
focusing on the exercise of normative powers on the Personal Income Tax 
(PIT). This is done by presenting and comparing the evolution of the use of 
taxing powers by two sets of subnational governments: the Canadian Provinces 
and the Spanish Autonomous Communities on the PIT. This tax is chosen 
because it is one of the most politically visible taxes.The main interest of this 
comparison lays in the fact that, despite the prevailing differences in the 
constitutional and institutional backgrounds of these countries, some of the 
outcomes are similar or at least comparable and there is reason to believe that it 
will continue to be that way. The paper is divided in three parts. First, the 
constitutional, legal and institutional framework of both countries are presented, 
by paying special attention to the elements relevant to taxation. Second we 
examine the outcomes in both countries, paying the most attention to the field 
of PIT. Third we compare and contrast these uses. 
 
JEL Codes: H 200, H 770. 
Palabras clave: Fiscal federalism, taxation. 
 
  
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
— 7 — 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to present and compare the evolution over time 
of the use of taxing powers by two sets of subnational governments (SNGs): the 
Canadian Provinces and the Spanish Autonomous Communities (ACs) in the 
personal income tax (PIT) field, one of the most politically visible taxes.The main 
interest of this comparison lays in the fact that, despite the prevailing differences 
in the constitutional and institutional backgrounds of these countries, some of 
the outcomes are similar or at least comparable. The paper is divided in three 
parts. First, we present the constitutional, legal and institutional framework of 
both countries, putting the emphasis on the elements relevant to taxation. 
Second we examine the outcomes in both countries, paying the most attention 
to the field of personal income taxes (PIT). Third we compare and contrast 
these uses. We will refer to the central government as respectively the federal 
government (Canada) and the State (Spain). 
2.   CANADA AND SPAIN: THE TAXING POWERS OF SNGS 
Departing from very different starting points, the Spanish and Canadian 
experience with the assignment of taxation powers presents many similarities, 
the most relevant being that in both cases there has been an increase in the tax 
autonomy of SNGs from either 1945 or 1978. We will now briefly present each 
case separately. 
2.1.   Canada 
Constitutional Legal framework 
Canada is one of the most decentralized federal countries in the world. 
Interestingly, when the Canadian federation became a reality (1867) the intent 
at least in English Canada was to create a strong central government, perhaps in 
reaction to the US model, then coming out of a civil war (SCOTT, 1977: 256 et. 
seq.; PERRY, 1997). The main competencies attributed to the provinces 
including social welfare, health and education, were not then important sources 
of public spending. In the 20th century, the system became more decentralized, 
partly as a result of some judicial interpretations, which set the stage for the 
federation as it is today (SCOTT, 1977: 260 et. seq.). The Canadian evolution 
from centralization towards a much more decentralized model, as we know it 
today, forced it to address the question of the distribution of taxation powers. 
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Canada is not referred to formally in its constitution as a federal state; it is a 
Dominion1. However, the presence of sections 91-95 in the 1867 Constitution 
that specify the powers of the central and provincial government make Canada 
a federal state. Item 3 of Section 91 specifies that the federal government can 
carry out ‘The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation’ while item 2 of 
Section 92 specifies that provinces can use ‘Direct Taxation within the Province in 
order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes’. Thus, its Constitution 
bestows full access to all kinds of taxes (which in 1867 meant mainly indirect 
taxes and in particular customs duties and excises) to the central government, 
and shared access only to direct taxes to the Provinces. This is coherent with 
the original idea of creating a strong central government, the less relevant 
sources of taxation being given to the provinces. This situation did not last long. 
For instance, a flexible case-law interpretation of the term “direct taxation” 
allowed the Provinces to establish a Sales Tax as such (LA FOREST, 1981: 78 et. 
seq. MAGNET, 1998: 486-500). As a result, both provinces and the central 
government levy personal income taxes (PIT), corporate income taxes (CIT), 
sales taxes (GST,HST,RST-see table 2), payroll taxes, excise taxes and so on. 
Institutional framework 
Three factors are worth noting in this context: 
1.   Canada is the second largest country in the world with important 
distances between various provinces. As a result, policy choices made in 
a given province often have little consequences on the behavior of the 
residents of most other provinces since transaction costs associated with 
distance make it to expensive to profit from a behavioral change. 
2.   Canada is made up of two main language groups, anglophones and 
francophones. The latter group mainly (80% ) resides in the province of 
Quebec ,with half of those residents unilingual speakers of French and 
even more of them exhibiting a preference for living in French. As a result, 
they are not mobile within Canada(North America) outside Quebec. 
3.   Canada is a close neighbor of the United States and linked to it (and 
Mexico) by the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This 
treaty does not impact as such on tax choices .However, the greater 
integration of the Canadian economy with the US economy observed 
following the introduction of free trade2 has meant that the need (real or 
perceived-this is debatable) to adjust Canadian taxes to account for changes 
in the US, which was always present, has increased in recent years. 
                                          
1  A biblical term seen as neutral by the drafters of the Constitution. 
2  From 1989 to 2000, exports as a share of GDP went from 26 to 46%, with exports to the 
US rising from 19 to 38% of GDP. 
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2.2.   Spain 
Constitutional/Legal framework 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 purposely omits any reference to the form 
of the State. That is, it does not describe it as centralized, federal or regional. 
After almost forty years of Franco’s Dictatorship, which among other, entailed a 
very centralized government, the framers of the 1978 Constitution had before 
them one of the most difficult tasks that Spanish politicians could ever come 
across: to resolve the ‘regional question’ for good. This challenge was met by 
not defining the new system, but by establishing a procedural framework 
instead. Thus, what the Constitution does is to establish an ‘optional autonomy 
system’ (the so-called ‘principio dispositivo’). Groups of provinces which existed 
prior to 1978 as administrative units of the State with borders reflecting in part 
history, provided that they have common historical, cultural and economic 
characteristics, had the right to join in an AC. If they decide to do so, they then 
have to choose which matters they want to be in charge of and what level of 
authority they want to acquire3. In other words, this is autonomy ‘à la carte’ or a 
‘cheese platter’ system. Between 1978 and 1983, all of the Spanish provinces 
engaged in this process, so that the whole country is presently divided into 17 
ACs4 (LÓPEZ GUERRA, 1993 and 1996). 
The constitutional provision relating to the taxation powers of AC is article 
157 which states that: 
1.   The resources of the Self-governing Communities shall consist of: 
a)   Taxes wholly or partially made over to them by the State; surcharges on State 
taxes and other shares in State revenue. 
b)   Their own taxes, rates and special levies. 
c)   Transfers from an inter-territorial compensation fund and other allocations to 
be charged to the State Budget. 
d)   Revenues accruing from their property and private law income. 
e)   Interest from loan operations. 
                                          
3  But note that like in the Canadian case, constitutional articles indicate what powers the 
federal government (sec. 149) and the autonomous communities has in the first case or may 
choose to exercise in the second. 
4  Spain is divided into 17 Autonomous Communities: Andalucía, Castilla y Leon, Asturias, 
Cataluña, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, Cantabria, Galicia, Valencia, Murcia, La Rioja, 
Asturias, Islas Baleares, Islas Canarias, Madrid, Pais Vasco (the Basque Country) and Navarra, 
as well as two Autonomous Cities, Ceuta and Melilla. Note that what is said in the discussion 
does not apply to the two Autonomous Cities, since they do not have legislative powers. The 
Canary Islands also have a special tax regime in some aspects (i.e. no Value Added Tax), 
although it doesn´t differ that much from the general system. 
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2.   The Self-governing Communities may under no circumstances introduce measures 
to raise taxes on property located outside their territory or likely to hinder the free 
movement of goods or services. 
3.   Exercise of the financial powers set out in subsection 1 above, rules for settling the 
conflicts which may arise, and possible forms of financial cooperation between the 
Self-governing Communities and the State may be laid down by an organic act [an 
Act passed by the State with a special, reinforced, majority]. 
This article gives the impression that the ACs’ taxation powers are very broad. 
However, the Special Law for the Financing of the Autonomous Communities, Law 
8/1980 (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas – hereafter, the 
LOFCA) implemented under article 157(3) of the Constitution broadly limited the 
powers of ACs. Therefore, and despite the fact that the Constitution clearly 
bestows taxation powers upon the ACs, the LOFCA imposes severe limits on the 
creation by them of new taxes. The most important limitation is the prohibition of 
double taxation (Sections 6.2 and 6.3), which prevents autonomous taxes from 
being similar to taxes already levied by the State and the municipalities. Since the 
existing tax room was traditionally occupied by the State and the municipalities, and 
this did not change when the ACs became a reality, little tax room was left for ACs 
(RUIZ ALMENDRAL; ZORNOZA PÉREZ, 2004 and 2005). 
An important feature of shared tax system is its asymmetry, which among 
other things, entails the existence of two different financing systems: the “foral” 
system, applicable to the Basque Country and Navarra, and the so-called 
“common system”, applicable to the remaining fifteen ACs. The Constitution 
recognizes the autonomy of ACs and bestows upon them taxation powers. It 
also recognizes that the two so-called “historical regions” –the Basque Country 
and Navarra– are entitled to maintain their historical norms or regimes, which 
in fiscal terms translates into them having a substantially different system, known 
as Concierto (Basque Country) and Convenio (Navarra) systems. Both these 
terms translate into English as ‘agreement’5. The main characteristic of this kind 
of system is that it entails a maximum level of taxation autonomy, which means 
that in these two ACs, their provinces (Álava, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, in the 
case of the Basque Country, and Navarra, which is uni-provincial) (RUIZ 
ALMENDRAL, 2003a) have powers to pass legislation, with only a few 
limitations6, on the main taxes of the Spanish fiscal system, as well as to collect 
                                          
5  According to the First additional provision of the Constitution “the Constitution protects and 
respects the historic rights of the territories with traditional charts (fueros). The general updating of 
historic rights shall be carried out, where appropriate, within the framework of the Constitution and of the 
Statutes of Autonomy”; see RUIZ ALMENDRAL: 2003b, for more details on the Quota systems. 
6  Such limitations are established in the laws regulating the Convenio and Concierto, and basically 
refer to the need to maintain a certain level of harmonization with the State’s tax system. They are, 
however, established in quite broad terms, which for example allow the Basque Country to 
establish corporation tax credits that differ broadly from those of the State or other AC in practice. 
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all taxes. Because the State is still responsible for the provision of some public 
functions or services within the territory of these two ACs, it is entitled to 
receive a certain sum of money from them, known as the ‘Cupo’ (quota). 
Under the common system, the ACs receive most of their revenues from 
the State, in the form of transfers. Generally, the establishment of new taxes is 
not a very attractive option for ACs. On the one hand, most of the ACs’ taxes 
are costly to administer and do not generate much revenue. On the other, 
almost every time an AC establishes a new tax, the State challenges it before the 
Constitutional Court.7 Such prohibitions equally affect the creation of new taxes 
by the provinces of the foral ACs. However, because they hold extensive 
powers on most of the relevant taxes (the Concierto or Convenio taxes), they do 
not need to create new ones. This situation inspired the 1997 and 2002 reforms 
of the common system, which will be dealt with later on. 
The small proportion of own tax revenues in the financing of the common-
system ACs8 results in a substantial lack of fiscal responsibility. This situation 
derives both from the fact that they have limited taxation powers, and from 
their insufficient use of the powers that they already have. This scarce tax or 
fiscal responsibility contrasts with the larger responsibility that the ACs have in 
other areas. (ZORNOZA PÉREZ, 1987: 971-72; CASTELLS, 1988: 129 et seq., 
and 2002: 14 et seq.; SOLÉ-VILANOVA, 1990: 350 et seq.; RUIZ ALMENDRAL, 
2002 and 2004; RUIZ ALMENDRAL; ZORNOZA PÉREZ: 2005). And it is 
precisely this situation that has served as the motor for change in fiscal 
federalism in Spain and which, as we will see, has led to substantial reforms of 
the ACs’ financing system. Table 1 summarizes the differences between 
common system ACs and foral ACs’ taxation autonomy. 
                                          
7  A fairly recent example is Catalonia, which established a tax on large commercial areas 
(Impuesto sobre grandes establecimientos comerciales) by the Law 16/2000, of December 29th. 
No sooner had the law been approved by Catalonia’s Parliament than it was challenged by 
the State before the Constitutional Court, on the grounds that it is equivalent to some of the 
municipalities’ taxes (the property tax and the economic activities tax). RUIZ ALMENDRAL; 
ZORNOZA PÉREZ: 2004. 
8  For the ACs within the Cupo system, the revenues deriving from taxes represent 94 per 
cent of expenditure, while transfers from the State represent less than 1 per cent in the case 
of the Basque Country, and less than 3 per cent in the case of Navarra. For the common-
system ACs, transfers still represent more than 60 per cent of their revenues. Taxes only 
represent about 20 per cent; within this category, ceded taxes, which still operate, in 
practice, as a mere transfer of funds as most ACs have exercised their powers in a very 
limited way, represent about 90 per cent. The source for these data are: Órgano de 
Coordinación Tributaria de Euskadi (2002), p. 81, and Liquidación de Presupuestos de las 
Comunidades y Ciudades Autónomas (2003). These can be found at: 
http://www.estadief.minhac.es. 
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Table 1 
COMPARISON OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF COMMON-SYSTEM 
AND FORAL ACS, SPAIN, 2005 
Main Taxes in Spain Legislative Powers that 
foral ACs may assume 
Legislative powers that common-
system ACs may assume 
Personal income tax Total regulation of the tax Tax rates (must have same 
number of tax brackets as the 
State tax) 
Tax credits, under certain 
conditions  
Corporation income tax Total regulation of the tax None 
Tax on income of non-
residents 
Regulation of the tax only 
in the case of permanent 
establishment in the foral 
territory 
None 
Wealth tax Total regulation of the tax Tax rates 
Minimum threshold 
Tax credits 
Death and gift taxes Total regulation of the tax Deductions (mainly, for family 
circumstances) 
Tax rates 
Deductions and tax credits 
Tax administration regulations 
Taxes on transfers and 
official documents 
Total regulation of the tax Tax rates 
Tax credits 
Tax administration regulations 






Tax administration regulations 
Value added tax None None 
Excise duties None None 
Source:   RUIZ ALMENDRAL: 2003a; RUIZ ALMENDRAL; ZORNOZA PÉREZ: 2005. 
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Institutional framework 
1.   Belonging to the EU has had important consequences for the distribution 
of authority in every Member State with multiple levels of governments (PÉREZ 
TREMPS, 2000: 1079 et seq.). Spain is no exception, and European integration 
poses a very important limitation to the exercise of taxation powers by the ACs. 
Obviously, such consequences have a greater impact for the foral ACs, due to 
their wider taxation powers. 
In this regard, there have been some conflicts when the EU has questioned 
both the generally lower tax burden of the tax system in the Basque Country 
and Navarra, in comparison to the common system, as well as the very 
existence of such different tax regimes within the same country. A good 
example of this is the European Commission Decision No. 93/337/CEE of May 
10th, 1993, where it stated that some of the tax measures of the Basque 
corporation income tax may be inconsistent with the right of establishment 
(Section 43 EC Treaty) and may also fall under the category of ‘state aids’ 
(Section 87 EC Treaty). Of special interest are the conclusions of the Advocate 
General, Mr Antonio Saggio, presented on 1st July 1999 in the accumulated cases 
C-400/97, C-401/97 and C-402/97, also relating to the corporation income tax9.  
In the few cases where the Constitutional Court has had to deal with the 
Cupo system, it has clearly stated that it is consistent with the Constitution (inter 
alia, in Opinion 181/1988). However, a recent opinion of the same Court 
(96/2002) may have started a new line of thought, which would clearly limit the 
importance of the constitutional recognition of historic rights. This opinion is 
very complicated, mainly because it does not state clearly, but rather ‘suggests’, 
obiter dicta, that a divergent tax system may not comply with the principle of 
equality stated in article 14 of the Constitution. 
In this case, brought by the AC of La Rioja, a neighbor of the foral ACs, which 
claimed the foral ACs were engaging in fiscal competition, the Constitutional 
Court ruled that the foral autonomy itself is not sufficient to render tax 
provisions admissible, and that the equality rights are as much part of the 
Constitution as are the special provisions that guarantee the historic rights. The 
relevance of this Opinion goes far beyond the actual decision taken10 because, 
for the first time ever, the Court seems to call into question the existence of 
such different systems. This decision has been the source of much controversy, 
as indicated by the fact that it was rejected by half of the Court’s judges and 
could therefore only be approved because the President was in favour. It is 
                                          
9  Where most fiscal benefits established by this region are declared contrary to the freedom 
of establishment enshrined in the EU Treaty. 
10  Which basically consisted of declaring void a State law that aimed to compensate European 
non-residents for certain differences in their tax treatment in the foral and common ACs. 
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likely that this Opinion would not have been adopted had the European 
Commission not questioned the foral systems previously. 
The latest judicial episode has been the controversial Decision of the 
Supreme Court (STS 9/12/2004, Sección segunda), that has declared void 
virtually all sections of the Basque Country’s legislation11 on the Corporation tax 
containing all sorts of tax benefits, including special deferral regimes and a 
substantially lower tax rate than the rest of Spain. This advantageous tax regime, 
La Rioja claimed, resulted in harmful tax competition. Interestingly enough, the 
Supreme Court has used virtually only European law as a tool in the legal 
reasoning, and hence the main reason for the Decision has been the assumption 
that the Basque’s Corporation tax benefits constitute a state aid12. There are 
many flaws in this legal reasoning, such as a lack of a thorough explanation as to 
why exactly the said legislation infringes the European law (FALCÓN Y TELLA: 
2005, 7 et seq.). However, the most striking aspect of the Supreme Court’s 
reasons is that they do not mention any of the pertinent provisions contained in 
the Spanish Constitution, which would have allowed to reach the same 
conclusion, possibly in a more direct and logical way (i.e., among other, section 
156, that requires the coherence between autonomy and solidarity13). The 
interest in these Decisions lays not so much in their conclusion, but in the fact 
that they would have probably not been adopted in absence of the above 
mentioned background. The European law is thus also indirectly having a 
decisive impact on the extent of the Community’s powers. And this is probably 
just the beginning. 
Belonging to the EU also means that no subnational taxation powers can be 
bestowed on European taxes, such as VAT or excise duties. Also, the high level 
of convergence in the Corporation Income Tax, due to some harmonization of 
accounting rules, explains why neither the Basque Country nor Navarra have 
introduced substantial changes in this tax. It also explains why the possibility of 
bestowing taxation powers on this tax onto the common-system ACs has never 
even been discussed. 
                                          
11  One special feature of the Basque country’s autonomy lays in the fact that the taxation 
powers are actually held by the three provinces (Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya), that have 
each its own legislation, following a number of harmonization guidelines established in the 
Statute of Autonomy and in the Ley de Concierto Vasco. Because such tax provisions do not 
formally have the status of a law, but are some kind of special regulations, the Supreme Court 
may declare them void. Had they had the formal range of a law, only the Constitutional Court 
may have been able to tackle them. 
12  Incidentally, the European Court of Justice had already declared state aid a specific part of the 
said regulation, in Decisions C-183 and 197/02, Daewoo, and C-186 AND 188/02-p. Ramondin. 
13  Article 156(1) states that: The Autonomous Communities 'shall enjoy financial autonomy 
for the development and exercising of their powers, in conformity with the principles of co-
ordination with the State Treasury and solidarity amongst all Spaniards. 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
— 15 — 
2.   Size becomes an issue in Spain when we account for the various 
asymmetries of the system; Spain is then too small. These have notably 
influenced the whole decentralization process, and they continue to affect 
future talks of deeper decentralization. The cultural and sociological variations 
among Communities are great. One of the main reasons is the existence of own 
languages in as many as six out of seventeen Communities (Catalonia, Valencia, 
Balearic Islands, Basque Country, Navarra, Galizia). There are also historical 
reasons that explain the present asymmetries, from the Arab cohabitation in the 
southern part from the late eight century until the end of the fifteenth, to the 
traditional independent nature of Catalonia or the Basque areas, just to name 
some examples. These asymmetries have been substantially minored by the 
1978 Constitution although they still remain present. There are two principal 
reasons why the State of Autonomies is asymmetrical. The first lies in the 
procedural framework established by the Constitution. It provides two special 
procedures for ACs to be formed. They differ in that one allows for more and 
faster autonomy, while the other entails a more limited and gradual gain of 
authority. These are usually referred to as the ‘fast-lane’ and ‘slow-lane’ 
processes. Fast-lane ACs could initially take on more authority, including health 
and education, which together represent about 80 per cent of the public 
spending on policy competences that can be taken on by ACs. Eventually, slow 
laners may increase their authority and gain access to the maximum level, 
provided that they follow the process established in Section 148.2. The second 
explanation for asymmetry lies in the recognition of the historic rights of the 
Basque Country and Navarra, enshrined in the first additional provision of the 
Spanish Constitution. This has resulted in them having a much greater level of 
competences. The first type of asymmetry can be categorized as de facto or 
transitorial; it refers only to the initial process, but does not prevent all ACs 
from eventually gaining access to the same level of authority. The second type is 
a de jure asymmetry 
3.   THE USE OF TAX POWERS BY SNGS: CANADA AND SPAIN 
In this second section, we present first the general use of tax powers by 
SNGs in both countries then focus on the choices in the area of PIT. For the 
sake of clarity, we also present the cases separately in the first place. 
3.1.   Canada 
Canadian provinces have chosen to exercise their taxation powers in all 
major fields. In 2004 all of them levy both personal and corporate income taxes 
at various rates and almost all levy sales taxes using a mix of VAT and retail sales 
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taxes (except for Alberta, which has no sales tax). Finally, some provinces levy 
payroll taxes and most levy capital taxes on corporations. In all cases, they are 
completely free in setting the base, rates, and collection mechanisms. There are 
no tax harmonization laws as we will see exists in Spain, let alone national laws 
setting tax parameters. The only constraint is that if they wish to see either the 
CIT, HST or PIT collected by the federal government free of charge, they must 
use the same base. This in practice serves as a harmonization measure that 
keeps the PIT to a minimal possible identity. Table 2 presents the tax systems in 
place for 2002.One will note that Québec is distinct from the other provinces in 
its higher degree of tax autonomy. 
The occupation of the tax fields has not always been this way. Before WWII, 
provinces and the federal government occupied the PIT and CIT fields. During 
WWII, the provinces had “rented out” the PIT, CIT and succession duties fields 
to the federal government. An agreement was necessary for the Dominion to 
solely occupy these fields. Hence in 1946, they occupied none of these fields. 
What we will now document is how they re-occupied the PIT field. 
Table 2 















Base Rate Type 
Collection
/Base 
Newfoundland 10.57 18.02 F 15.1 F 18.1 HST F 
Prince Edward Island 19.81 16.71 F 17.5 F 10.1 RST P 
Nova Scotia 18.79 19.83 F 16.1 F 18.1 HST F 
New Brunswick 19.68 17.84 F 13.0 F 18.1 HST F 
Québec 16.11 24.11 P 18.9 P 17.5 QST+ P 
Ontario 16.05 11.16 F 12.1 P 18.1 RST P 
Manitoba 10.91 17.41 F 15.5 F 17.1 RST P 
Saskatchewan 11.0 15.01 F 10.1 F 17.1 RST P 
Alberta 10.11 10.11 F 11.5 P 10.1 — — 
British Columbia 16.10 14.71 F 13.5 F 17.5 RST P 
Source:   Finances of the Nation, 2004, Canadian Tax Foundation, various Tables. 
Notes:  Sales taxes :HST : Harmonized Sales Tax. 
QST+: Provincial Base similar to federal GST. Québec collects the federal GST on its 
territory and remits it to the federal government. 
Prov.: Provincial sales taxes. 
Capital taxes are general/Bank rates. 
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The occupation of the PIT tax field by the federal government after WWII 
was formalized in the Dominion-Provincial Tax Rental Agreement Act (SMITH, 
1998). Briefly, provinces that signed the tax rental agreement that covered the 
1947-1952 period received in exchange the most beneficial combination of per 
capita payment, Wartime Tax Agreements payments, and statutory subsidies. 
All provinces except Ontario and Québec signed this agreement (Newfoundland 
signed it in 1949, when it joined Canada)14. Provinces that decided to impose a 
PIT would see their resident receive a credit of 5% for such tax against the 
federal PIT (BIRD; VAILLANCOURT: 2002, 17). The preamble of the final 
version of the agreement gives its general purposes: “Whereas in view of the 
prospective termination of the Wartime Tax Agreement between the Parties 
hereto and the consequent prospect of a return to the pre-war dual system of 
direct taxation, it is desirable to enter into an agreement designed: 
1.   To establish a more equitable system of taxation throughout Canada by 
reducing duplication of direct taxation and of machinery for the 
collection of direct taxes. 
2.   To give a greater measure of stability to the revenues (of the Province) in 
order to enable it more adequately to carry out its responsibilities, and 
3.   To enable Canada, with the cooperation of provincial government, to 
carry out fiscal and other national policies intended to maintain high levels 
of employment and production.” (SMITH: 1998, 47). 
In 1950, Ontario adopted a law creating a tax equal to 5 percent of the 
Dominion tax (the amount of the Dominion credit) but the Dominion refused to 
collect it and the Ontario Income Tax Act was not proclaimed. It was only in 
1954 during the second Tax rental agreement (1952-1957) that Québec created 
its own PIT (Québec had a PIT before WWII). Arguments used to justify this 
action were that “the constitution concedes to provinces priority in the field of 
taxation” and that “it would be unjust and prejudicial to the province to deprive 
itself of a source of revenue to which it had a prior right and that was necessary 
to meet the needs resulting from the vigorous strides it had taken” (SMITH: 
1998, 57). The Québec tax on personal income (QTONPI) was a progressive 
tax with rates between 2.3 and 12%(progressivity similar to that of the federal 
PIT). Québec asked Ottawa to make it deductible, but the federal credit was only 
5%. Ottawa did not accept easily this “rebellion”. The QTONPI was over the 
credit offered by Ottawa for non-signatory provinces and was considered as 
double taxation. But, an amendment to the Income Tax Act was introduced to 
allow all provinces to do the same thing if they wanted “To accommodate 
Québec’s PIT structure without causing taxpayers much excessive taxation, 
loosing too much revenue or wrecking the tax rental system” (SMITH: 1998, 61), 
                                          
14  Both decided to impose their own corporate income tax (CIT), initially at a rate of 8.5%, 
which was higher than the 7% credit for provincial CIT offered by federal government. 
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the federal government decided to change from the credit of 5% to an 
abatement of 10% for provincial PITs as of 1955. Under this system, the 
Provinces were offered three possibilities (SMITH: 1998, 74): a) to rent out 
their tax fields; b) to impose and collect these taxes themselves, and c) to impose 
them but to have them collected by the federal government. In this case, it would 
have to levy them at the standard rates and keep its definitions of income 
identical to those in the federal law. Québec chose the second alternative. 
In 1962 the Tax Rental Agreement was replaced by a Tax Collection 
Agreement and the abatement by a reduction of federal taxes, the creation of 
tax room, thus allowing provinces to set their own tax rates” The federal 
government would collect them free of charge if they used the same base 
(definition of income, deductions, exemptions,..) as the federal government and 
set them as a tax on tax (TOT), thus using the same progressivity as the federal 
PIT. At that time provinces were offered the opportunity to replace part of 
federal transfers for social spending with a greater occupancy of the PIT tax 
field; only Québec agreed to do this in 1965. 
In 1972, the federal government modified its PIT, widening the base, leading 
to an increase in the provincial PIT rates and in 1977, it reduced for a last time 
its PIT rates as part of a modification of transfers to provinces that saw major 
cost-sharing transfers transformed into block grants made up of both a cash 
payment and the revenue from provincial PIT increases. This transfer called 
Established Program Financing (EPF) and expanded and renamed CHST(Canada 
Health and Social Transfer) in 1995 and divided into the Canada Health 
Transfer(CHT) and the Canada Social Transfer(CST). 
It is only following the 1972 and more often the 1977 changes that provinces 
outside Québec begin to show some tax initiatives in the PIT field. Figure 1 
presents information on the timing of the introduction of the three most 
common tax measures: 
•   The most common and earliest introduced measures are tax surtaxes. 
These are calculated as a% of the provincial PIT; they vary both across 
provinces at a point in time and for a province over time. Table 3 
illustrates the second point for Ontario. 
•   The second most common measure are investment tax credits for various 
types of investments ; these are usually for investments in shares of 
businesses( equity or stock savings plans) active in the relevant province but 
can be for specialized types of activities such as livestock (Saskatchewan). 
•   The third most common measure is credits for older individuals (65+). 
These aim at reducing the PIT paid by poor older individuals. 
Other measures were also used. Let us note the temporary home heating 
tax credit introduced in Ontario for 1981, 1982 and 1983 in response to high oil 
prices; the income –linked child care expenses (children less than 7) tax credit 
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introduced in 1997 in Ontario; the learning tax credit introduced in 1997 in 
Manitoba and aimed at reducing the cost of tuition; the income-linked mortgage 
tax credit in 1980 and 1981 in Saskatchewan; the family employment tax credit 
introduced in Alberta in 1997. 
Table 3 
EVOLUTION OF ONTARIO’S SURTAX FROM 1983 TO 1999 
Date 
Income level at which 
the surtax becomes 
operational 
Description of the surtax 
1983 $2,179 2,5% temporary surtax on provincial tax payable in 
excess of $110,80. 
1984  
$2,150 
5,0% temporary surtax on provincial tax payable in 
excess of $110,80. 
1985  No surtax applicable 















7,0% surtax on provincial tax payable between $5,500 
and $10,000. 






14,0% surtax on provincial tax payable between $5,500 
and $10,000. 




20,0% surtax on provincial tax payable between $5,500 
and $8,000. 




20,0% surtax on provincial tax payable between $5,310 
and $7,635. 




20,0% surtax on provincial tax payable between $4,555 
and $6,180. 




20,0% surtax on provincial tax payable between $4,057 
and $5,217. 




20,0% surtax on provincial tax payable between $3,750 
and $4,681. 
46,0% surtax on provincial tax payable in excess of $4,681.
 — 20 — 
The taxation activity of Canadian provinces in the PIT field shows the 
importance of incentives. An adequate link between transfers and tax points 
encourages SNGs to use their powers. But at least as important as that is the 
fact that such entities view their powers as theirs. As shown in figure 1, when 
provinces re-entered the PIT field, they did not immediately use their powers 
to establish taxes but to introduce all types of tax credits. With time, however, 
SNGs realize that the political burden or increasing fiscal pressure may be 
offset by the potential benefits (i.e. revenues, fiscal policy) of exercising their 
powers. 
Figure 1 
INTRODUCTION OF SPECIFIC TAX MEASURES IN 
PROVINCIAL PIT CANADIAN PROVINCES.1972-1999 
 
 
Furthermore, the Canadian case also shows the importance of PIT, which 
explains the many attempts to introduce a de minimis level of harmonization in 
this tax, at least with reference to the definition of the tax base. We will also see 
that this is a subject of preoccupation for the Spanish ACs and the State. A 
similar evolution can be expected in Spain, whose particularities will be dealt 
with no. 
3.2.   Spain 
As mentioned above, ACs have had taxation powers since the 1978 
Constitution was approved, but both the limited tax room available to them and 
their lack of governing experience have deterred them from employing such 
powers. This last aspect has a certain psychological nature, but quite 
enlightening: ACs being the new tier (“new kid”) of government, they first 
needed to become accepted as governing unit by the citizens, before they could 
establish taxes or increase the fiscal pressure in any other way. In this context, it 
is not so hard to understand why the attempt of the AC of Madrid to establish a 
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surcharge on the Personal Income Tax (PIT) was severely rejected by voters15. 
It was probably too early to have an AC tax citizens. 
The Communities have nevertheless exercised their taxation powers by 
establishing their own taxes. Because of the double taxation prohibition, or the 
non-equivalence rule, they have had to “invent” new sources of taxation in order 
to avoid taxes similar to those levied by the State and Municipalities. There are 
many examples of such kind of taxes. One relevant feature of the taxing activity of 
the Communities is the prevailing “copy cat” behaviour. When a Community 
introduces a new tax, the others pay very close attention to its structure and the 
way the new tax is received by the State. If it is considered an attractive means to 
obtain more revenues, i.e. it is easy to administer, does not cause too strong 
popular opposition, etc., and the State’s reaction is not too harsh, i.e. the 
introduction of the tax is not challenged by the State before the Constitutional 
Court or even if it is, the legal arguments for the lawsuit are not considered very 
strong, the other Communities may introduce a similar, in most cases identical, 
tax. Normally, Communities will wait for at least a year to see what the State’s 
reaction will be. One example of this behaviour is the following sequence of tax 
changes: in 1991, Baleares introduced a tax on certain facilities that may affect the 
environment16. Six years later, Extremadura adopted an identical tax17. Another 
example is the above mentioned Cataluña’s tax, which was introduced in 2000, 
taxing certain shopping areas, such as big supermarkets18. The year after, Navarra 
adopted a similar tax and Asturias followed in 200319. Despite there being a large 
number of autonomous taxes, –mostly environmental–, they do not account for 
more than one per cent of ACs’ revenues. 
A drastic change in this area took place under the 1996 State-AC financial 
agreements, that lead to substantial reforms in some Laws (specially the 
LOFCA). Before, all the financial agreements had dealt mainly with transfer 
                                          
15  In 1984 (Law 15/1984, december 19th, del Fondo de Solidaridad Municipal), Madrid 
established a 3 per cent surcharge on the PIT, on a tax on tax basis. In the midst of a severe 
political turmoil, it was challenged before the Constitutional Court which, in Opinion 150/1990 
declared it perfectly valid. However, the government of Madrid AC had already decided to 
suspend the application of the tax (in 1985), which never entered into force. The defeat of the 
then Socialist government in the AC elections of 1995 was partly attributed to that attempt. 
16  Impuesto sobre determinadas instalaciones que inciden en el Medio Ambiente. 
17  These two taxes were established, respectively, by Law No. 19/1991 of 20 December 
1991 (Baleares), and by Law No. 7/1997 of 29 May 1997 (Extremadura). The Balearic tax was 
declared void by the Constitutional Court (Decision 289/2000). Although the ruling cannot be 
extended to the tax established by Extremadura, this probably explains why no other 
Community has created another similar tax. 
18  Impuesto sobre Grandes Establecimientos Comerciales. 
19  The laws regulating these three taxes are: Law n.º 16/2000 of 19 december 2000 (Cataluña); 
Law No. 23/2001, (Navarra) and Law n.º 15/2002 of 27 december 2002 (Asturias). 
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issues, never touching the tax room or tax assignment problem. The relevance 
of the 1996 reform is twofold. On the one hand, tax powers are redistributed 
with tax room given to ACs. The until then theoretical possibility to establish 
surcharges is modified with Communities acquiring the right to regulate certain 
aspects of some taxes that previousy had been of the exclusive responsibility of 
the Central Government (the so-called ceded taxes –CT–). On the other hand, 
the idea that ACs could gain greater fiscal autonomy or responsibility by 
establishing surcharges (recargos) on State’s taxes was abandoned. This 
possibility was considered by the framers of the reform, and by some of the 
Communities, to be inadequate as it could lead to a substantial de-harmonization 
of the tax system (RUIZ ALMENDRAL, 2004; RUIZ ALMENDRAL; ZORNOZA 
PÉREZ: 2005). Instead, changes to CTs enable the use of a harmonized basis –
identical tax base, tax definitions, etc.- while they leave certain room for 
differentiation –deductions, tax rates,–. Thus, until 1996, CTs had been a way of 
making transfers to ACs, with some of the taxes owned and entirely regulated by 
the State received and, in some cases, administered by the Communities. As of 
then, they become shared taxes In July 2001, the ACs and the State agreed to 
broaden the scope of these ‘’ceded taxes’’. As a result, the ACs’ legislative 
powers for some of these taxes are now greater than in 1996 and new taxes have 
been ceded to them. The new powers over the ceded taxes vary widely, 
depending on the tax. In some cases, the ceded tax operates substantially as a 
transfer (as in the Value Added Tax) but, in others, the broad scope of the 
powers granted makes the tax very similar to an autonomous tax (as in the case 
of gambling taxes). The position as at 1 january 2002 is shown in table 4. 
Table 4 





Legislative Powers that 
ACs may assume 
Personal income tax 133 State Tax rates (must have same number of 
tax brackets as the State tax) 
Tax credits, under certain conditions 
Wealth tax 100 ACs Tax rates 
Minimum threshold 
Tax credits 
Death and gift taxes 100 ACs Deductions (mainly, for family 
circumstances) 
Tax rates 
Deductions and tax credits 
Tax administration regulations 
(Sigue) 
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(Continuación) 
Ceded Taxes AC share 
(%) 
Administration Legislative Powers that 
ACs may assume 
Taxes on transfers 
and official 
documents 
100 ACs Tax rates 
Tax credits 
Tax administration regulations 




Tax administration regulations 
Value added tax 135 State None 
Excise duties 140 State None 
Tax on wine 140 State None 
Tax on electricity 100 State None 
Tax on vehicles 100 ACs Tax rates (under certain conditions 
and limits) 
Special tax on gas 100 ACs Tax rates (under certain conditions 
and limits) 
Tax administration regulations 
Source:   The authors and RUIZ ALMENDRAL: 2003a; RUIZ ALMENDRAL; ZORNOZA 
PÉREZ, 2005. 
 
One of the most outstanding aspects of the 1996 reform, or at least the one 
that caused more political discussion, was the fact that tax legislation 
competencies were transferred also on the PIT, until then considered the 
keystone or typical example of a central tax. The transfer of such powers on the 
PIT was one of the main arguments used to claim that this trasnfer was 
unconstitutional. Thus, in 1997 some constitutionality claims were filed before 
the Constitutional Court, which still has not decided on the topic, but who 
probably won’t, as most Communities have withdrawn their claims after 
accepting the 2001 financing system20. 
Following the 1996-2001 reform, the yield from CTs will still accrue to the 
Communities on the basis of taxes paid by their residents. But now, the yield is 
the result of the Community’s own taxing autonomy, exercised by either 
accepting the State tax structure or should a Community exercise its new 
                                          
20  Andalucía, Asturias, Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha filled claims. However, at the 
present moment the case is no longer active, for all of them have withdrawn their claim. 
Theoretically, the Constitutional Court is able to continue with the claim, but in this case it 
has decided not to, and thus leave this problem to the political arena. 
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legislative powers, by choosing its own tax structure. The powers of ACs are 
not uniform across ceded taxes. Dependent on the tax, the yield will totally or 
partially accrue to the ACs, which may or may not have legislative powers and 
be in charge of the administration of the tax. Furthermore, the ACs are given 
the option to choose whether they want to exercise their regulatory powers. If 
they fail to do so or decide not to exercise such powers, the State determines 
every aspect of that tax in that AC. If an AC decides to pass legislation modifying 
the above mentioned authorized aspects over any ceded tax, it may do so by 
enacting legislation which will then substitute for State law in those areas where 
the AC can legislate. For instance, in the case of the wealth tax (where ACs may 
establish whatever tax rates they choose), State legislation on tax rates will be 
applied to residents in those ACs that decide not to establish their own tax 
rates. The way that this option has been structured21 –and the fact that the State 
still guarantees to ACs lump-sum grants allocated on the basis of historical 
shares in State transfers– serves to create a strong disincentive for ACs to use 
their new taxation powers. Evidence of this disincentive is the fact that, since 
1997, the ACs have mainly used their powers to create new fiscal benefits 
(RUIZ ALMENDRAL, 2004: 405 et seq.). 
In general, and applicable to all ceded taxes, Communities must: (1) respect 
the solidarity principle, which basically means an interdiction of harmful tax 
competition; (2) not establish tax measures that will entail discrimination based 
on where the income comes from, where the immovable property is located, 
where expenditure is realized or where a certain contract is signed/enforced, 
etc.22, and (3) they must maintain a similar global fiscal pressure as in the rest of 
Spain. None of these constraints are crystal clear, but they have been 
established so as to leave the State some room to control or define the scope of 
ACs powers. Until now, none of them have been invoked, although there are 
some cases where the exercise of their powers by ACs may raise some doubts 
as to whether they are respecting them (RUIZ ALMENDRAL, 2003). There are 
specific conditions for the PIT, as we will later see. 
This reassignment of taxation powers constitutes the most important tax 
reform since the State of Autonomies became a reality. Under the new regime, 
common-system ACs have substantially increased their taxation powers. 
Although the gap between the powers of the foral and common ACs remains 
                                          
21  The formula guarantees a minimum to all Communities, regardless of whether or not they 
exercise their taxation powers; see details in RUIZ ALMENDRAL; ZORNOZA PÉREZ: 2005. 
22  Note that it is discrimination that is forbidden, not an objective differentiation. The 
difference will usually lay in those cases when an AC is trying to fiscally “penalize” tax payers 
for choosing another Community to celebrate a contract, close a deal, etc. Of course the 
“thin red line” separation discrimination from differentiation will not always be clear, and like 
in many other cases in the Spanish State, the interpretation given by the Constitutional Court 
will be decisive to understand this provision; RUIZ ALMENDRAL, 2004: 361 et seq. 
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quite large, it has certainly been reduced by the reform. If the trend continues, 
the possibility that the two systems end up converging should not be completely 
ruled out. Such convergence derives mainly from the common-system ACs’ 
newly acquired taxation powers. Until 1997, only foral ACs could pass legislation 
and control the main taxes of the system (such as the personal income or the 
corporation income taxes). Since then, common-system ACs have gradually 
gained access to most important tax bases, excluding Corporation income taxes. 
Although the gap is still wide, for common-system ACs can only regulate certain 
aspects of some of these taxes while foral ACs may regulate most elements of 
the said taxes except for certain aspects. However, when we compare the 
powers that the common-system and foral ACs hold on the main taxes of the 
taxation system, it is clear that a profound asymmetry still prevails. 
4.   SHARING TAX FIELD IN THE PIT IN CANADA AND SPAIN. 
4.   DIFFERENT RULES, SIMILAR OUTCOMES? 
In this section we now explicitly compare the situation in the two countries. 
As we have already mentioned, the legal foundations of these two tax regimes 
are quite different. The differences in Canada in PIT are the result of the 
freedom to choose available to all provinces but mainly exercised by Québec. 
Thus, only Québec has an autonomous collected PIT and CIT. The differences 
in Spain are the result of the revival of the historical economic regimes23 (fueros) 
under the above mentioned interpretation of the Constitutional first additional 
provision, on the one hand, and of the fairly recent attribution of taxation 
powers on the PIT, on the other hand. 
When we compare the dynamics of the sharing of the PIT field in Spain and 
Canada several elements are interesting: 
1)   In both countries there has been some concern varying over time on 
maintaining (or not) a centralized or at least an harmonized PIT. This of course 
derives from the fact that in both cases this tax has a great political relevance 
that originates both from its quantitative importance and from its visibility for 
citizens. Note that, for exactly the same reasons, the question of whether or 
not the PIT in the European Union should be to some extent subject to 
harmonization has also been discussed (RUIZ ALMENDRAL, 2002). The 
questions that arise when deciding whether or not this tax should be 
harmonized and to what extent, are always whether or not the definition of the 
tax base should be the same and what level of fiscal pressure, tax progressivity 
                                          
23  Under Franco’s Dictatorship, all fueros were in principle extinct, although Alava did 
maintain certain prerrogatives. 
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and structure it should have. Departing from this common element, the 
experiences of both countries are different but they may overtime lead to a 
similar outcome, as in the end of the day, both SNGs hold taxation powers on 
this tax, but must use them in a more or less harmonized fashion. 
In both Canada and Spain, the subnational PIT operates on a tax on income 
basis. Strictly speaking, there is no subnational tax in Spain, but rather a 
subnational regulation of a State’s tax. This is carried out on a tax on income 
basis, and taking the State’s regulation on the PIT both as a basis and as a 
framework. The regulation of the central PIT actually leaves some room for the 
ACs regulation. In 1997, this room represented 15 per cent of the taxable 
income, that is, ACs where responsible for 15 per cent of the fiscal pressure of 
taxpayers in their territory in that given tax. As of 2001, that room increased to 
33 per cent. That means that all tax credits affect 33 per cent of the taxable 
income, and the same goes for the tax rates (although no AC has set them yet). 
2)   Who decides what elements should be similar or different and where are 
those rules to be found? The legal framework is quite different between the two 
countries. While Canadian provinces may establish their own PIT if they wish, 
Spanish ACs are restricted by the prohibition of equivalence24, and they partially 
depend on the State to be able to exercise their taxation powers on the PIT 
field. Of course they may always establish a surcharge on the Central State’s 
PIT, but this possibility is politically unfeasible unless some tax room is provided 
beforehand. 
In Canada this framework is a series of inter-governmental agreements (Tax 
Collection Agreements) that are linked to the fact that the State collects both the 
central and the Provinces’ PITs. This collection is free provided the Provinces’ 
legislation abides by certain rules, such as respecting the definition of the tax 
base established by the State25. 
In Spain the PIT is still collected by the State26. The laws that put in practice 
the attribution of some taxation powers do establish a number of conditions or 
limitations under which the ACs may exercise their powers on this tax. Thus, 
apart from the general conditions mentioned above, applicable to all ceded 
taxes, in the case of the PIT: 
                                          
24  Such prohibition is established in sections 6.2 and 6.3 of the Ley Orgánica de Financiación de 
las Comunidades Autónomas, which following the attribution of section 157.3 of the Spanish 
Constitution, fully establishes the general guidelines of the Autonomous Communities’ 
financing system. According to these sections, an AC may not create a tax that is in any way 
similar or equivalent to an already existing tax, created by the State or a municipality. 
25  Canada. Department of Finance. Federal Administration of Provincial Taxes. New Directions. 
Ottawa, january 2000. 
26  By means of a collecting agency, the Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria, AEAT 
(www.aeat.es). 
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3)   a)   The tax rates established by the ACs must follow the same 
progressivity pattern as the State’s, and they must also have the same 
number of brackets. Note that this rule could be easily circumvented 
by establishing a surcharge, which is not forbidden. However, the 
odds of an AC doing so are small, as it would be politically costly, and  
3)   b)   They may only establish tax credits in certain areas or for certain 
items: family and personal situation of tax payers, non entrepreneurial 
investments and donations or gifts. 
3)   Once a certain level of harmonization for the PIT is agreed to, the 
question that arises is how to put it in practice, which of course entails the 
question of how to “penalize” non-harmonization. In Canada, the Dominion will 
levy a collecting fee on Provinces whose PIT differs from the guidelines. In 
Spain, the laws that put into practice the attribution of certain taxation powers 
on the PIT do not specifically mention any sanctions. However, should an AC 
infringe the framework established by the State, it could always decide to take 
back those powers27. This possibility may however be too painful to use, so the 
most likely solution to a conflict of this nature would probably be either a 
political agreement, or eventually, a claim before the Constitutional Court. 
As shown in the tables below, the activity of ACs and the Provinces differs 
substantially.
                                          
27  Legally, the powers that ACs now have on ceded taxes have been delegated to them by the 
State, by means of section 150.1 of the Spanish Constitution; “The State may confer upon one 
or various Communities the power to pass legislation for themselves within the framework of the 
principles, bases and guidelines laid down by a State act. Each enabling act shall make provision 
for the method of supervision by the Cortes Generales over the Communities legislation“; RUIZ 
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CONCLUSION 
The most obvious conclusion is that the nature of the choices made in both 
countries is different. In Canada the most common use of PIT autonomy by 
Provinces is to levy surtaxes. Hence, tax autonomy is mainly used to raise 
revenues. On the contrary, no Spanish AC has yet dared to change the tax rates 
established by default by the State, and most ACs have only established tax 
credits on family and personal circumstances. This may have been influenced by 
the fact that in Spain the PIT has largely been considered a “sacred cow” in 
personal taxation. Opinion 182/1997 of the Constitutional Court clearly reflects 
this view by stating that taking into account its central position in the tax system, 
any change in this tax will mean a change in the distribution of the ability to pay 
among citizens. Such ability to pay being a constitutional principle (article. 31.1 
states the right and duty of citizens to pay taxes according to their ability to 
pay), transferring powers on the PIT to ACs could not occur without discussion. 
Furthermore, part of this view was deeply influenced by some streams of 
thought in fiscal federalism literature, that regard PIT as one of the ideally 
central taxes, due to its contribution to the stabilization function (MUSGRAVE, 
1983: 4 et seq.). Such ideas may have also influenced the Canadian model, and it 
has often been discussed whether it would not be better to have a more 
uniform PIT (BOADWAY, 1996). 
However, once the SNGs have and exercise taxation powers on the PIT, the 
fear of a tax jungle may disappear or become less important. In Spain, it is to be 
noted that most discussion on whether or not ACs should have taxing powers 
on the PIT took place in 1996, when legislative powers were first transferred 
onto ACs on this tax. When in 2001 such powers were extended to the current 
33 per cent no one seemed surprised, and there was almost no discussion, 
probably due to the fact that by then it was more or less clear that no AC was 
interested in undertaking drastic changes on the tax. But how long will this last? 
Considering the speed at which Spain has been decentralized, and how fast ACs 
“learn” to activate their authority, perhaps not for long. Moreover, ACs have 
already increased fiscal pressure in other taxes, such as gambling taxes or stamp 
duty, and they have also introduced all kinds of minor indirect taxes, user fees 
or environmental taxes. Furthermore, the Spanish government has already 
announced that the Communities must start using their taxation powers on 
ceded taxes in order to obtain greater revenues to finance the ever increasing 
Health expenditure, which alone in the period 1999-2002 has grown about 
24,7% in all common-system ACs28. The time for the Spanish ACs’ PIT should 
not be too far. 
                                          
28  See El País, march 24th 2005 (p. 13). 
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SÍNTESIS 
PRINCIPALES IMPLICACIONES DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA 
El 1 de enero de 2002 entró en vigor un conjunto de normas que modifica 
sustancialmente el hasta entonces vigente sistema de financiación autonómica, en lo 
que probablemente constituya la reforma más importante en dicho sistema desde la 
formación del Estado de las autonomías. 
Este trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar la citada reforma desde la perspectiva del 
principio de corresponsabilidad fiscal, y en particular, sus resultados a la luz del 
ejercicio de potestades normativas de las Comunidades Autónomas en el IRPF. Para 
ello, se realiza un estudio comparado entre el modelo canadiense de distribución de 
competencias en el impuesto sobre la renta (Personal Income Tax) y el español. 
El resultado es que, frente al comportamiento que es habitual en las Provincias 
canadienses, las Comunidades Autónomas han tendido a ejercer sus competencias a la 
baja, estableciendo todo tipo de beneficios fiscal que, si bien son económicamente 
poco significativos, pues su cuantía es reducida, muestra el escaso interés de nuestros 
gobiernos subcentrales por apropiarse de las nuevas fuentes impositivas. Es posible 
que ello sea explicable habida cuenta de lo reciente de estas competencias. Por eso, el 
análisis conjunto con el caso canadiense tiene interés para comprobar las tendencias a 
medio plazo de los entes subcentrales en el ejercicio de sus potestades normativas. 
El estudio tiene particular relevancia en un contexto como el actual, donde es muy 
probable que se modifique sustancialmente el vigente sistema de financiación 
autonómica, a consecuencia de las reformas de los Estatutos de Autonomía que 
demandan un mayor grado de descentralización fiscal. 
Sin embargo, la experiencia demuestra que las reformas normativas son en sí 
mismas insuficientes. A la luz de los datos expuestos, resulta evidente que el sistema 
actual de financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas no contiene los incentivos 
suficientes y necesarios para fomentar el empleo corresponsable de las nuevas 
potestades normativas en materia de impuestos cedidos. 
Por ello, seguramente resulta ineludible plantear una modificación de las reglas 
financieras del modelo que tomen en cuenta también la capacidad fiscal de una manera 
más precisa que la que se viene empleando hasta ahora, pues ésta constituye la única 
manera de que los impuestos cedidos sirvan efectivamente al objetivo para el que 
fueron reformados. Desde esta perspectiva, el modelo canadiense debería ser 




 — 39 — 
NORMAS DE PUBLICACIÓN DE PAPELES DE TRABAJO DEL 
INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES 
Esta colección de Papeles de Trabajo tiene como objetivo ofrecer un vehículo de 
expresión a todas aquellas personas interasadas en los temas de Economía Pública. Las 
normas para la presentación y selección de originales son las siguientes: 
1. Todos los originales que se presenten estarán sometidos a evaluación y podrán 
ser directamente aceptados para su publicación, aceptados sujetos a revisión, o 
rechazados. 
2. Los trabajos deberán enviarse por duplicado a la Subdirección de Estudios 
Tributarios. Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Avda. Cardenal Herrera Oria, 378. 28035 
Madrid. 
3. La extensión máxima de texto escrito, incluidos apéndices y referencias 
bibliográfícas será de 7000 palabras. 
4. Los originales deberán presentarse mecanografiados a doble espacio. En la primera 
página deberá aparecer el título del trabajo, el nombre del autor(es) y la institución a la 
que pertenece, así como su dirección postal y electrónica. Además, en la primera 
página aparecerá también un abstract de no más de 125 palabras, los códigos JEL y las 
palabras clave. 
5. Los epígrafes irán numerados secuencialmente siguiendo la numeración arábiga. 
Las notas al texto irán numeradas correlativamente y aparecerán al pie de la 
correspondiente página. Las fórmulas matemáticas se numerarán secuencialmente 
ajustadas al margen derecho de las mismas. La bibliografía aparecerá al final del 
trabajo, bajo la inscripción “Referencias” por orden alfabético de autores y, en cada 
una, ajustándose al siguiente orden: autor(es), año de publicación (distinguiendo a, b, c 
si hay varias correspondientes al mismo autor(es) y año), título del artículo o libro, 
título de la revista en cursiva, número de la revista y páginas. 
6. En caso de que aparezcan tablas y gráficos, éstos podrán incorporarse 
directamente al texto o, alternativamente, presentarse todos juntos y debidamente 
numerados al final del trabajo, antes de la bibliografía. 
7. En cualquier caso, se deberá adjuntar un disquete con el trabajo en formato word. 
Siempre que el documento presente tablas y/o gráficos, éstos deberán aparecer en 
ficheros independientes. Asimismo, en caso de que los gráficos procedan de tablas 
creadas en excel, estas deberán incorporarse en el disquete debidamente identificadas. 
 
Junto al original del Papel de Trabajo se entregará también un resumen 
de un máximo de dos folios que contenga las principales implicaciones de 
política económica que se deriven de la investigación realizada. 
 — 40 — 
PUBLISHING GUIDELINES OF WORKING PAPERS AT THE 
INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES 
This serie of Papeles de Trabajo (working papers) aims to provide those having an 
interest in Public Economics with a vehicle to publicize their ideas. The rules gover-
ning submission and selection of papers are the following: 
1. The manuscripts submitted will all be assessed and may be directly accepted for 
publication, accepted with subjections for revision or rejected. 
2. The papers shall be sent in duplicate to Subdirección General de Estudios 
Tributarios (The Deputy Direction of Tax Studies), Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies), Avenida del Cardenal Herrera Oria, nº 378, Madrid 
28035. 
3. The maximum length of the text including appendices and bibliography will be no 
more than 7000 words. 
4. The originals should be double spaced. The first page of the manuscript should 
contain the following information: (1) the title; (2) the name and the institutional affi-
liation of the author(s); (3) an abstract of no more than 125 words; (4) JEL codes and 
keywords; (5) the postal and e-mail address of the corresponding author. 
5. Sections will be numbered in sequence with arabic numerals. Footnotes will be 
numbered correlatively and will appear at the foot of the corresponding page. 
Mathematical formulae will be numbered on the right margin of the page in sequence. 
Bibliographical references will appear at the end of the paper under the heading 
“References” in alphabetical order of authors. Each reference will have to include in this 
order the following terms of references: author(s), publishing date (with an a, b or c in 
case there are several references to the same author(s) and year), title of the article or 
book, name of the journal in italics, number of the issue and pages. 
6. If tables and graphs are necessary, they may be included directly in the text or 
alternatively presented altogether and duly numbered at the end of the paper, before 
the bibliography. 
7. In any case, a floppy disk will be enclosed in Word format. Whenever the 
document provides tables and/or graphs, they must be contained in separate files. 
Furthermore, if graphs are drawn from tables within the Excell package, these must 
be included in the floppy disk and duly identified. 
 
Together with the original copy of the working paper a brief two-page 
summary highlighting the main policy implications derived from the 
research is also requested. 
 — 41 — 
ÚLTIMOS PAPELES DE TRABAJO EDITADOS POR EL 
INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES 
2000 
11/00 Crédito fiscal a la inversión en el impuesto de sociedades y neutralidad impositiva: Más 
evidencia para un viejo debate. 
 Autor: Desiderio Romero Jordán. 
12/00 Estudio del consumo familiar de bienes y servicios públicos a partir de la encuesta de 
presupuestos familiares. 
 Autores: Ernesto Carrilllo y Manuel Tamayo. 
13/00 Evidencia empírica de la convergencia real.  
 Autores: Lorenzo Escot y Miguel Ángel Galindo. 
Nueva Época 
14/00 The effects of human capital depreciation on experience-earnings profiles: Evidence 
salaried spanish men. 
 Autores: M. Arrazola, J. de Hevia, M. Risueño y J. F. Sanz. 
15/00 Las ayudas fiscales a la adquisición de inmuebles residenciales en la nueva Ley del IRPF: 
Un análisis comparado a través del concepto de coste de uso. 
 Autor: José Félix Sanz Sanz. 
16/00 Las medidas fiscales de estímulo del ahorro contenidas en el Real Decreto-Ley 3/2000: 
análisis de sus efectos a través del tipo marginal efectivo. 
 Autores: José Manuel González Páramo y Nuria Badenes Plá. 
17/00 Análisis de las ganancias de bienestar asociadas a los efectos de la Reforma del IRPF 
sobre la oferta laboral de la familia española. 
 Autores: Juan Prieto Rodríguez y Santiago Álvarez García. 
18/00 Un marco para la discusión de los efectos de la política impositiva sobre los precios y 
el stock de vivienda. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 
19/00 Descomposición de los efectos redistributivos de la Reforma del IRPF.  
 Autores: Jorge Onrubia Fernández y María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz. 
10/00 Aspectos teóricos de la convergencia real, integración y política fiscal. 
 Autores: Lorenzo Escot y Miguel Ángel Galindo. 
2001 
11/01 Notas sobre desagregación temporal de series económicas. 
 Autor: Enrique M. Quilis. 
12/01 Estimación y comparación de tasas de rendimiento de la educación en España. 
 Autores: M. Arrazola, J. de Hevia, M. Risueño y J. F. Sanz. 
13/01 Doble imposición, “efecto clientela” y aversión al riesgo. 
 Autores: Antonio Bustos Gisbert y Francisco Pedraja Chaparro. 
14/01 Non-Institutional Federalism in Spain. 
 Autor: Joan Rosselló Villalonga. 
15/01 Estimating utilisation of Health care: A groupe data regression approach. 
 Autora: Mabel Amaya Amaya. 
 — 42 — 
16/01 Shapley inequality descomposition by factor components. 
 Autores: Mercedes Sastre y Alain Trannoy. 
17/01 An empirical analysis of the demand for physician services across the European Union. 
 Autores: Sergi Jiménez Martín, José M. Labeaga y Maite Martínez-Granado. 
18/01 Demand, childbirth and the costs of babies: evidence from spanish panel data. 
 Autores: José M.ª Labeaga, Ian Preston y Juan A. Sanchis-Llopis. 
19/01 Imposición marginal efectiva sobre el factor trabajo: Breve nota metodológica y 
comparación internacional. 
 Autores: Desiderio Romero Jordán y José Félix Sanz Sanz. 
10/01 A non-parametric decomposition of redistribution into vertical and horizontal 
components. 
 Autores: Irene Perrote, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 
11/01 Efectos sobre la renta disponible y el bienestar de la deducción por rentas ganadas en 
el IRPF. 
 Autora: Nuria Badenes Plá. 
12/01 Seguros sanitarios y gasto público en España. Un modelo de microsimulación para las 
políticas de gastos fiscales en sanidad. 
 Autor: Ángel López Nicolás. 
13/01 A complete parametrical class of redistribution and progressivity measures. 
 Autores: Isabel Rabadán y Rafael Salas. 
14/01 La medición de la desigualdad económica. 
 Autor: Rafael Salas. 
15/01 Crecimiento económico y dinámica de distribución de la renta en las regiones de la UE: 
un análisis no paramétrico. 
 Autores: Julián Ramajo Hernández y María del Mar Salinas Jiménez. 
16/01 La descentralización territorial de las prestaciones asistenciales: efectos sobre la igualdad. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Rosa Martínez López y Jesus Ruiz-Huerta. 
17/01 Redistribution and labour supply. 
 Autores: Jorge Onrubia, Rafael Salas y José Félix Sanz. 
18/01 Medición de la eficiencia técnica en la economía española: El papel de las 
infraestructuras productivas. 
 Autoras: M.a Jesús Delgado Rodríguez e Inmaculada Álvarez Ayuso. 
19/01 Inversión pública eficiente e impuestos distorsionantes en un contexto de equilibrio 
general. 
 Autores: José Manuel González-Páramo y Diego Martínez López. 
20/01 La incidencia distributiva del gasto público social. Análisis general y tratamiento 
específico de la incidencia distributiva entre grupos sociales y entre grupos de edad. 
 Autor: Jorge Calero Martínez. 
21/01 Crisis cambiarias: Teoría y evidencia. 
 Autor: Óscar Bajo Rubio. 
22/01 Distributive impact and evaluation of devolution proposals in Japanese local public 
finance. 
 Autores: Kazuyuki Nakamura, Minoru Kunizaki y Masanori Tahira. 
23/01 El funcionamiento de los sistemas de garantía en el modelo de financiación autonómica. 
 Autor: Alfonso Utrilla de la Hoz. 
 — 43 — 
24/01 Rendimiento de la educación en España: Nueva evidencia de las diferencias entre 
Hombres y Mujeres. 
 Autores: M. Arrazola y J. de Hevia. 
25/01 Fecundidad y beneficios fiscales y sociales por descendientes. 
 Autora: Anabel Zárate Marco. 
26/01 Estimación de precios sombra a partir del análisis Input-Output: Aplicación a la econo-
mía española. 
 Autora: Guadalupe Souto Nieves. 
27/01 Análisis empírico de la depreciación del capital humano para el caso de las Mujeres y 
los Hombres en España. 
 Autores: M. Arrazola y J. de Hevia. 
28/01 Equivalence scales in tax and transfer policies. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala, Rosa Martínez y Jesús Ruiz-Huerta. 
29/01 Un modelo de crecimiento con restricciones de demanda: el gasto público como 
amortiguador del desequilibrio externo. 
 Autora: Belén Fernández Castro. 
30/01 A bi-stochastic nonparametric estimator. 
 Autores: Juan G. Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 
2002 
11/02 Las cestas autonómicas. 
 Autores: Alejandro Esteller, Jorge Navas y Pilar Sorribas. 
12/02 Evolución del endeudamiento autonómico entre 1985 y 1997: la incidencia de los 
Escenarios de Consolidación Presupuestaria y de los límites de la LOFCA. 
 Autores: Julio López Laborda y Jaime Vallés Giménez. 
13/02 Optimal Pricing and Grant Policies for Museums. 
 Autores: Juan Prieto Rodríguez y Víctor Fernández Blanco. 
14/02 El mercado financiero y el racionamiento del endeudamiento autonómico. 
 Autores: Nuria Alcalde Fradejas y Jaime Vallés Giménez. 
15/02 Experimentos secuenciales en la gestión de los recursos comunes. 
 Autores: Lluis Bru, Susana Cabrera, C. Mónica Capra y Rosario Gómez. 
16/02 La eficiencia de la universidad medida a través de la función de distancia: Un análisis de 
las relaciones entre la docencia y la investigación. 
 Autores: Alfredo Moreno Sáez y David Trillo del Pozo. 
17/02 Movilidad social y desigualdad económica. 
 Autores: Juan Prieto-Rodríguez, Rafael Salas y Santiago Álvarez-García. 
18/02 Modelos BVAR: Especificación, estimación e inferencia. 
 Autor: Enrique M. Quilis. 
19/02 Imposición lineal sobre la renta y equivalencia distributiva: Un ejercicio de microsimulación. 
 Autores: Juan Manuel Castañer Carrasco y José Félix Sanz Sanz. 
10/02 The evolution of income inequality in the European Union during the period 1993-1996. 
 Autores: Santiago Álvarez García, Juan Prieto-Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 
11/02 Una descomposición de la redistribución en sus componentes vertical y horizontal: 
Una aplicación al IRPF. 
 Autora: Irene Perrote. 
 — 44 — 
12/02 Análisis de las políticas públicas de fomento de la innovación tecnológica en las 
regiones españolas. 
 Autor: Antonio Fonfría Mesa. 
13/02 Los efectos de la política fiscal sobre el consumo privado: nueva evidencia para el caso 
español. 
 Autores: Agustín García y Julián Ramajo. 
14/02 Micro-modelling of retirement behavior in Spain. 
 Autores: Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín y Franco Peracchi. 
15/02 Estado de salud y participación laboral de las personas mayores. 
 Autores: Juan Prieto Rodríguez, Desiderio Romero Jordán y Santiago Álvarez García. 
16/02 Technological change, efficiency gains and capital accumulation in labour productivity 
growth and convergence: an application to the Spanish regions. 
 Autora: M.ª del Mar Salinas Jiménez. 
17/02 Déficit público, masa monetaria e inflación. Evidencia empírica en la Unión Europea. 
 Autor: César Pérez López. 
18/02 Tax evasion and relative contribution. 
 Autora: Judith Panadés i Martí. 
19/02 Fiscal policy and growth revisited: the case of the Spanish regions. 
 Autores: Óscar Bajo Rubio, Carmen Díaz Roldán y M. a Dolores Montávez Garcés. 
20/02 Optimal endowments of public investment: an empirical analysis for the Spanish regions. 
 Autores: Óscar Bajo Rubio, Carmen Díaz Roldán y M.a Dolores Montávez Garcés. 
21/02 Régimen fiscal de la previsión social empresarial. Incentivos existentes y equidad del 
sistema. 
 Autor: Félix Domínguez Barrero. 
22/02 Poverty statics and dynamics: does the accounting period matter? 
 Autores: Olga Cantó, Coral del Río y Carlos Gradín. 
23/02 Public employment and redistribution in Spain. 
 Autores: José Manuel Marqués Sevillano y Joan Rosselló Villallonga. 
24/02 La evolución de la pobreza estática y dinámica en España en el periodo 1985-1995. 
 Autores: Olga Cantó, Coral del Río y Carlos Gradín. 
25/02 Estimación de los efectos de un "tratamiento": una aplicación a la Educación superior 
en España. 
 Autores: M. Arrazola y J. de Hevia. 
26/02 Sensibilidad de las estimaciones del rendimiento de la educación a la elección de 
instrumentos y de forma funcional. 
 Autores: M. Arrazola y J. de Hevia. 
27/02 Reforma fiscal verde y doble dividendo. Una revisión de la evidencia empírica. 
 Autor: Miguel Enrique Rodríguez Méndez. 
28/02 Productividad y eficiencia en la gestión pública del transporte de ferrocarriles 
implicaciones de política económica. 
 Autor: Marcelino Martínez Cabrera. 
29/02 Building stronger national movie industries: The case of Spain. 
 Autores: Víctor Fernández Blanco y Juan Prieto Rodríguez. 
30/02 Análisis comparativo del gravamen efectivo sobre la renta empresarial entre países y 
activos en el contexto de la Unión Europea (2001). 
 Autora: Raquel Paredes Gómez. 
 — 45 — 
31/02 Voting over taxes with endogenous altruism. 
 Autor: Joan Esteban. 
32/02 Midiendo el coste marginal en bienestar de una reforma impositiva. 
 Autor: José Manuel González-Páramo. 
33/02 Redistributive taxation with endogenous sentiments. 
 Autores: Joan Esteban y Laurence Kranich. 
34/02 Una nota sobre la compensación de incentivos a la adquisición de vivienda habitual 
tras la reforma del IRPF de 1998. 
 Autores: Jorge Onrubia Fernández, Desiderio Romero Jordán y José Félix Sanz Sanz. 
35/02 Simulación de políticas económicas: los modelos de equilibrio general aplicado. 
 Autor: Antonio Gómez Gómez-Plana. 
2003 
11/03 Análisis de la distribución de la renta a partir de funciones de cuantiles: robustez y 
sensibilidad de los resultados frente a escalas de equivalencia. 
 Autores: Marta Pascual Sáez y José María Sarabia Alegría. 
12/03 Macroeconomic conditions, institutional factors and demographic structure: What 
causes welfare caseloads? 
 Autores: Luis Ayala y César Pérez. 
13/03 Endeudamiento local y restricciones institucionales. De la ley reguladora de haciendas 
locales a la estabilidad presupuestaria. 
 Autores: Jaime Vallés Giménez, Pedro Pascual Arzoz y Fermín Cabasés Hita. 
14/03 The dual tax as a flat tax with a surtax on labour income. 
 Autor: José María Durán Cabré. 
15/03 La estimación de la función de producción educativa en valor añadido mediante redes 
neuronales: una aplicación para el caso español. 
 Autor: Daniel Santín González. 
16/03 Privación relativa, imposición sobre la renta e índice de Gini generalizado. 
 Autores: Elena Bárcena Martín, Luis Imedio Olmedo y Guillermina Martín Reyes. 
17/03 Fijación de precios óptimos en el sector público: una aplicación para el servicio 
municipal de agua. 
 Autora: M.ª Ángeles García Valiñas. 
18/03 Tasas de descuento para la evaluación de inversiones públicas: Estimaciones para España. 
 Autora: Guadalupe Souto Nieves. 
19/03 Una evaluación del grado de incumplimiento fiscal para las provincias españolas. 
 Autores: Ángel Alañón Pardo y Miguel Gómez de Antonio. 
10/03 Extended bi-polarization and inequality measures. 
 Autores: Juan G. Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 
11/03 Fiscal decentralization, macrostability and growth. 
 Autores: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez y Robert M. McNab. 
12/03 Valoración de bienes públicos en relación al patrimonio histórico cultural: aplicación 
comparada de métodos estadísticos de estimación. 
 Autores: Luis César Herrero Prieto, José Ángel Sanz Lara y Ana María Bedate Centeno. 
13/03 Growth, convergence and public investment. A bayesian model averaging approach. 
 Autores: Roberto León-González y Daniel Montolio. 
 — 46 — 
14/03 ¿Qué puede esperarse de una reducción de la imposición indirecta que recae sobre el 
consumo cultural?: Un análisis a partir de las técnicas de microsimulación. 
 Autores: José Félix Sanz Sanz, Desiderio Romero Jordán y Juan Prieto Rodríguez. 
15/03 Estimaciones de la tasa de paro de equilibrio de la economía española a partir de la 
Ley de Okun. 
 Autores: Inés P. Murillo y Carlos Usabiaga. 
16/03 La previsión social en la empresa, tras la Ley 46/2002, de reforma parcial del impuesto 
sobre la renta de las personas físicas. 
 Autor: Félix Domínguez Barrero. 
17/03 The influence of previous labour market experiences on subsequent job tenure. 
 Autores: José María Arranz y Carlos García-Serrano. 
18/03 Promoting sutdent's effort: standards versus torunaments. 
 Autores: Pedro Landeras y J. M. Pérez de Villarreal. 
19/03 Non-employment and subsequent wage losses. 
 Autores: José María Arranz y Carlos García-Serrano. 
20/03 La medida de los ingresos públicos en la Agencia Tributaria. Caja, derechos 
reconocidos y devengo económico. 
 Autores: Rafael Frutos, Francisco Melis, M.ª Jesús Pérez de la Ossa y José Luis Ramos. 
21/03 Tratamiento fiscal de la vivienda y exceso de gravamen. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 
22/03 Medición del capital humano y análisis de su rendimiento. 
 Autores: María Arrazola y José de Hevia. 
23/03 Vivienda, reforma impositiva y coste en bienestar. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 
24/03 Algunos comentarios sobre la medición del capital humano. 
 Autores: María Arrazola y José de Hevia. 
25/03 Exploring the spanish interbank yield curve. 
 Autores: Leandro Navarro y Enrique M. Quilis. 
26/03 Redes neuronales y medición de eficiencia: aplicación al servicio de recogida de basuras. 
 Autor: Francisco J. Delgado Rivero. 
27/03 Equivalencia ricardiana y tipos de interés. 
 Autoesr: Agustín García, Julián Ramajo e Inés Piedraescrita Murillo. 
28/03 Instrumentos y objetivos de las políticas de apoyo a las PYME en España. 
 Autor: Antonio Fonfría Mesa. 
29/03 Análisis de incidencia del gasto público en educación superior: enfoque transversal. 
 Autora: María Gil Izquierdo. 
30/03 Rentabilidad social de la inversión pública española en infraestructuras. 
 Autores: Jaime Alonso-Carrera, María Jesús Freire-Serén y Baltasar Manzano. 
31/03 Las rentas de capital en Phogue: análisis de su fiabilidad y corrección mediante fusión 
estadística. 
 Autor: Fidel Picos Sánchez. 
32/03 Efecto de los sistemas de rentas mínimas autonómicas sobre la migración interregional. 
 Autora: María Martínez Torres. 
33/03 Rentas mínimas autonómicas en España. Su dimensión espacial. 
 Autora: María Martínez Torres. 
 — 47 — 
34/03 Un nuevo examen de las causas del déficit autonómico. 
 Autor: Santiago Lago Peñas. 
35/03 Uncertainty and taxpayer compliance. 
 Autores: Jordi Caballé y Judith Panadés. 
2004 
01/04 Una propuesta para la regulación de precios en el sector del agua: el caso español. 
 Autores: M.a Ángeles García Valiñas y Manuel Antonio Muñiz Pérez. 
02/04 Eficiencia en educación secundaria e inputs no controlables: sensibilidad de los 
resultados ante modelos alternativos. 
 Autores: José Manuel Cordero Ferrera, Francisco Pedraja Chaparro y Javier Salinas Jiménez. 
03/04 Los efectos de la política fiscal sobre el ahorro privado: evidencia para la OCDE. 
 Autores: Montserrat Ferre Carracedo, Agustín García García y Julián Ramajo Hernández. 
04/04 ¿Qué ha sucedido con la estabilidad del empleo en España? Un análisis desagregado 
con datos de la EPA: 1987-2003. 
 Autores: José María Arranz y Carlos García-Serrano. 
05/04 La seguridad del empleo en España: evidencia con datos de la EPA (1987-2003). 
 Autores: José María Arranz y Carlos García-Serrano. 
06/04 La ley de Wagner: un análisis sintético. 
 Autor: Manuel Jaén García. 
07/04 La vivienda y la reforma fiscal de 1998: un ejercicio de simulación. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 
08/04 Modelo dual de IRPF y equidad: un nuevo enfoque teórico y su aplicación al caso 
español. 
 Autor: Fidel Picos Sánchez. 
09/04 Public expenditure dynamics in Spain: a simplified model of its determinants. 
 Autores: Manuel Jaén García y Luis Palma Martos. 
10/04 Simulación sobre los hogares españoles de la reforma del IRPF de 2003. Efectos sobre 
la oferta laboral, recaudación, distribución y bienestar. 
 Autores: Juan Manuel Castañer Carrasco, Desiderio Romero Jordán y José Félix Sanz Sanz. 
11/04 Financiación de las Haciendas regionales españolas y experiencia comparada. 
 Autor: David Cantarero Prieto. 
12/04 Multidimensional indices of housing deprivation with application to Spain. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala y Carolina Navarro. 
13/04 Multiple ocurrence of welfare recipiency: determinants and policy implications. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala y Magdalena Rodríguez. 
14/04 Imposición efectiva sobre las rentas laborales en la reforma del impuesto sobre la 
renta personal (IRPF) de 2003 en España. 
 Autoras: María Pazos Morán y Teresa Pérez Barrasa. 
15/04 Factores determinantes de la distribución personal de la renta: un estudio empírico a 
partir del PHOGUE. 
 Autores: Marta Pascual y José María Sarabia. 
16/04 Política familiar, imposición efectiva e incentivos al trabajo en la reforma de la 
imposición sobre la renta personal (IRPF) de 2003 en España. 
 Autoras: María Pazos Morán y Teresa Pérez Barrasa. 
 — 48 — 
17/04 Efectos del déficit público: evidencia empírica mediante un modelo de panel dinámico 
para los países de la Unión Europea. 
 Autor: César Pérez López. 
18/04 Inequality, poverty and mobility: Choosing income or consumption as welfare indicators. 
 Autores: Carlos Gradín, Olga Cantó y Coral del Río. 
19/04 Tendencias internacionales en la financiación del gasto sanitario. 
 Autora: Rosa María Urbanos Garrido. 
20/04 El ejercicio de la capacidad normativa de las CCAA en los tributos cedidos: una 
primera evaluación a través de los tipos impositivos efectivos en el IRPF. 
 Autores: José María Durán y Alejandro Esteller. 
21/04 Explaining. budgetary indiscipline: evidence from spanish municipalities. 
 Autores: Ignacio Lago-Peñas y Santiago Lago-Peñas. 
22/04 Local governmets' asymmetric reactions to grants: looking for the reasons. 
 Autor: Santiago Lago-Peñas. 
23/04 Un pacto de estabilidad para el control del endeudamiento autonómico. 
 Autor: Roberto Fernández Llera 
24/04 Una medida de la calidad del producto de la atención primaria aplicable a los análisis 
DEA de eficiencia. 
 Autora: Mariola Pinillos García. 
25/04 Distribución de la renta, crecimiento y política fiscal. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel Galindo Martín. 
26/04 Políticas de inspección óptimas y cumplimiento fiscal. 
 Autores: Inés Macho Stadler y David Pérez Castrillo. 
27/04 ¿Por qué ahorra la gente en planes de pensiones individuales? 
 Autores: Félix Domínguez Barrero y Julio López-Laborda. 
28/04 La reforma del Impuesto sobre Actividades Económicas: una valoración con 
microdatos de la ciudad de Zaragoza. 
 Autores: Julio López-Laborda, M.ª Carmen Trueba Cortés y Anabel Zárate Marco. 
29/04 Is an inequality-neutral flat tax reform really neutral? 
 Autores: Juan Prieto-Rodríguez, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 
30/04 El equilibrio presupuestario: las restricciones sobre el déficit. 
 Autora: Belén Fernández Castro. 
2005 
01/05 Efectividad de la política de cooperación en innovación: evidencia empírica española. 
 Autores:Joost Heijs, Liliana Herrera, Mikel Buesa, Javier Sáiz Briones y Patricia Valadez. 
02/05 A probabilistic nonparametric estimator. 
 Autores: Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 
03/05 Efectos redistributivos del sistema de pensiones de la seguridad social y factores 
determinantes de la elección de la edad de jubilación. Un análisis por comunidades 
autónomas. 
 Autores: Alfonso Utrilla de la Hoz y Yolanda Ubago Martínez. 
14/05 La relación entre los niveles de precios y los niveles de renta y productividad en los países 
de la zona euro: implicaciones de la convergencia real sobre los diferenciales de inflación. 
 Autora: Ana R. Martínez Cañete. 
 — 49 — 
05/05 La Reforma de la Regulación en el contexto autonómico. 
 Autor: Jaime Vallés Giménez. 
06/05 Desigualdad y bienestar en la distribución intraterritorial de la renta, 1973-2000. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Antonio Jurado Málaga y Francisco Pedraja Chaparro. 
07/05 Precios inmobiliarios, renta y tipos de interés en España. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 
08/05 Un análisis con microdatos de la normativa de control del endeudamiento local. 
 Autores: Jaime Vallés Giménez, Pedro Pascual Arzoz y Fermín Cabasés Hita. 
09/05 Macroeconomics effects of an indirect taxation reform under imperfect competition. 
 Autor: Ramón J. Torregrosa. 
10/05 Análisis de incidencia del gasto público en educación superior: nuevas aproximaciones. 
 Autora: María Gil Izquierdo. 
11/05 Feminización de la pobreza: un análisis dinámico. 
 Autora: María Martínez Izquierdo. 
12/05 Efectos del impuesto sobre las ventas minoristas de determinados hidrocarburos en la 
economía extremeña: un análisis mediante modelos de equilibrio general aplicado.. 
 Autores: Francisco Javier de Miguel Vélez, Manuel Alejandro Cardenete Flores y Jesús 
Pérez Mayo. 
13/05 La tarifa lineal de Pareto en el contexto de la reforma del IRPF. 
 Autores: Luis José Imedio Olmedo, Encarnación Macarena Parrado Gallardo y María 
Dolores Sarrión Gavilán. 
14/05 Modelling tax decentralisation and regional growth. 
 Autores: Ramiro Gil-Serrate y Julio López-Laborda. 
15/05 Interactions inequality-polarization: characterization results. 
 Autores: Juan Prieto-Rodríguez, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 
16/05 Políticas de competencia impositiva y crecimiento: el caso irlandés. 
 Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, Carlos Garcimartín y Luis Rivas. 
17/05 Optimal provision of public inputs in a second-best scenario. 
 Autores: Diego Martínez López y A. Jesús Sánchez Fuentes. 
18/05 Nuevas estimaciones del pleno empleo de las regiones españolas. 
 Autores: Javier Capó Parrilla y Francisco Gómez García. 
19/05 US deficit sustainability revisited: a multiple structural change approach. 
 Autores: Óscar Bajo-Rubio. Carmen Díaz-Roldán y Vicente Esteve. 
20/05 Aproximación a los pesos de calidad de vida de los “Años de Vida Ajustados por 
Calidad” mediante el estado de salud autopercibido. 
 Autores: Anna García-Altés, Jaime Pinilla y Salvador Peiró. 
21/05 Redistribución y progresividad en el Impuesto sobre Sucesiones y Donaciones: una 
aplicación al caso de Aragón. 
 Autor: Miguel Ángel Barberán Lahuerta. 
22/05 Estimación de los rendimientos y la depreciación del capital humano para las regiones 
del sur de España. 
 Autora: Inés P. Murillo. 
23/05 El doble dividendo de la imposición ambiental. Una puesta al día. 
 Autor: Miguel Enrique Rodríguez Méndez. 
 — 50 — 
24/05 Testing for long-run purchasing power parity in the post bretton woods era: evidence 
from old and new tests. 
 Autor: Julián Ramajo Hernández y Montserrat Ferré Cariacedo. 
25/05 Análisis de los factores determinantes de las desigualdades internacionales en las 
emisiones de CO2 per cápita aplicando el enfoque distributivo: una metodología de 
descomposición por factores de Kaya. 
 Autores: Juan Antonio Duro Moreno y Emilio Padilla Rosa. 
26/05 Planificación fiscal con el impuesto dual sobre la renta. 
 Autores: Félix Domínguez Barrero y Julio López Laborda. 
27/05 El coste recaudatorio de las reducciones por aportaciones a planes de pensiones y las 
deducciones por inversión en vivienda en el IRPF 2002. 
 Autores: Carmen Marcos García, Alfredo Moreno Sáez, Teresa Pérez Barrasa y César 
Pérez López. 
28/05 La muestra de declarantes IEF-AEAT 2002 y la simulación de reformas fiscales: 
descripción y aplicación práctica. 
 Autores: Alfredo Moreno, Fidel Picos, Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, María Antiqueira y 
Lucía Torrejón. 
2006 
01/06 Capital gains taxation and progressivity. 
 Autor: Julio López Laborda. 
02/06 Pigou’s dividend versus Ramsey’s dividend in the double dividend literature. 
 Autores: Eduardo L. Giménez y Miguel Rodríguez. 
03/06 Assessing tax reforms. Critical comments and proposal: the level and distance effects. 
 Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde Míguez y Jesús Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell. 
04/06 Incidencia y tipos efectivos del impuesto sobre el patrimonio e impuesto sobre 
sucesiones y donaciones. 
 Autora: Laura de Pablos Escobar. 
05/06 Descentralización fiscal y crecimiento económico en las regiones españolas. 
 Autores: Patricio Pérez González y David Cantarero Prieto. 
16/06 Efectos de la corrupción sobre la productividad: un estudio empírico para los países 
de la OCDE. 
 Autores: Javier Salinas Jiménez y M.ª del Mar Salinas Jiménez. 
07/06 Simulación de las implicaciones del equilibrio presupuestario sobre la política de 
inversión de las comunidades autónomas. 
 Autores: Jaime Vallés Giménez y Anabel Zárate Marco. 
18/06 The composition of public spending and the nationalization of party sistems in western 
Europe. 
 Autores: Ignacio Lago-Peñas y Santiago Lago.Peñas. 
09/06 Factores explicativos de la actividad reguladora de las Comunidades Autónomas 
(1989-2001). 
 Autores: Julio López Laborda y Jaime Vallés Giménez. 
10/06 Disciplina credititicia de las Comunidades Autónomas. 
 Autor: Roberto Fernández Llera. 
11/06 Are the tax mix and the fiscal pressure converging in the European Union?. 
 Autor: Francisco J. Delgado Rivero. 
 — 51 — 
12/06 Redistribución, inequidad vertical y horizontal en el impuesto sobre la renta de las 
personas físicas (1982-1998). 
 Autora: Irene Perrote. 
13/06 Análisis económico del rendimiento en la prueba de conocimientos y destrezas 
imprescindibles de la Comunidad de Madrid. 
 Autores: David Trillo del Pozo, Marta Pérez Garrido y José Marcos Crespo. 
14/06 Análisis de los procesos privatizadores de empresas públicas en el ámbito 
internacional. Motivaciones: moda política versus necesidad económica. 
 Autores: Almudena Guarnido Rueda, Manuel Jaén García e Ignacio Amate Fortes. 
15/06 Privatización y liberalización del sector telefónico español. 
 Autores: Almudena Guarnido Rueda, Manuel Jaén García e Ignacio Amate Fortes. 
16/06 Un análisis taxonómico de las políticas para PYME en Europa: objetivos, instrumentos 
y empresas beneficiarias. 
 Autor: Antonio Fonfría Mesa. 
17/06 Modelo de red de cooperación en los parques tecnológicos: un estudio comparado. 
 Autora: Beatriz González Vázquez. 
18/06 Explorando la demanda de carburantes de los hogares españoles: un análisis de 
sensibilidad. 
 Autores: Santiago Álvarez García, Marta Jorge García-Inés y Desiderio Romero Jordán. 
19/06 Cross-country income mobility comparisons under panel attrition: the relevance of 
weighting schemes. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala, Carolina Navarro y Mercedes Sastre. 
20/06 Financiación Autonómica: algunos escenarios de reforma de los espacios fiscales. 
 Autores: Ana Herrero Alcalde, Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, Javier Loscos Fernández, 
María Antiqueira y José Manuel Tránchez. 
21/06 Child nutrition and multiple equilibria in the human capital transition function. 
 Autores: Berta Rivera, Luis Currais y Paolo Rungo. 
22/06 Actitudes de los españoles hacia la hacienda pública. 
 Autor: José Luis Sáez Lozano. 
23/06 Progresividad y redistribución a través del IRPF español: un análisis bienestar social 
para el periodo 1982-1998. 
 Autores: Jorge Onrubia Fernández, María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz, Santiago Díaz de 
Sarralde y César Pérez López. 
24/06 Análisis descriptivo del gasto sanitario español: evolución, desglose, comparativa 
internacional y relación con la renta. 
 Autor: Manuel García Goñi. 
25/06 El tratamiento de las fuentes de renta en el IRPF y su influencia en la desigualdad y la 
redistribución. 
 Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Jorge Onrubia Fernández y María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz. 
26/06 La reforma del IRPF de 2007: una evaluación de sus efectos. 
 Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde Míguez, Fidel Picos Sánchez, Alfredo Moreno Sáez, 
Lucía Torrejón Sanz y María Antiqueira Pérez. 
27/06 Proyección del cuadro macroeconómico y de las cuentas de los sectores 
institucionales mediante un modelo de equilibrio. 
 Autores: Ana María Abad, Ángel Cuevas y Enrique M. Quilis. 
 — 52 — 
28/06 Análisis de la propuesta del tesoro Británico “Fiscal Stabilisation and EMU” y de sus 
implicaciones para la política económica en la Unión Europea.. 
 Autor: Juan E. Castañeda Fernández. 
29/06 Choosing to be different (or not): personal income taxes at the subnational level in 
Canada and Spain. 
 Autores: Violeta Ruiz Almendral y François Vaillancourt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
